The recent decision by several Western countries, including Germany, to deport Afghan nationals accused of serious crimes such as murder has sparked considerable controversy and triggered widespread reactions both domestically and internationally. Moreover, there are reports indicating that rejected asylum seekers are being forcibly returned to Afghanistan. This shift in policy has generated divergent responses: some argue that criminal offenders should not be granted asylum in host countries, while others stress that the current situation in Afghanistan makes forced returns extremely dangerous.
In reality, this wave of deportations has created an opportunity for the Taliban regime—a globally isolated group actively seeking engagement with the West. The Taliban have long employed a range of tactics to open diplomatic channels and extract political concessions. This article critically examines how the Taliban are exploiting the deportation process as a tool for political gain, drawing on field data and first-hand sources.
Since the 1990s, the Taliban have maintained deep ties with regional and international terrorist networks. According to UN and credible international reports, Taliban-controlled Afghanistan has become a safe haven for more than 21 terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISIS-Khorasan, Ansarullah of Tajikistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union – Uzbekistan, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Jaish al-Adl, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad. The Taliban support these groups by facilitating recruitment, training, and financing, using them as leverage against regional powers.
In negotiations with neighbouring countries, the Taliban have promised to curb these groups’ activities against foreign interests, conditional upon political recognition and economic engagement. This form of strategic extortion has become a key component of the Taliban’s foreign diplomacy.
For example, China continues to engage with the Taliban in the hope that the group will suppress or hand over members of the ETIM. Similarly, the Taliban’s use of TTP to apply pressure on Pakistan exemplifies their utilization of proxy terrorism to advance geopolitical interests. Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan, have also received assurances from the Taliban that jihadist activity will be contained within Afghan territory, provided that diplomatic and economic ties with the regime are maintained.
Despite the appearance of mutual interests, these states may be underestimating the Taliban’s ideological commitment to Pashtunwali and Islamic jihad, values that are deeply embedded in the group’s identity and strategy. Expecting the Taliban to dismantle such networks is akin to asking them to sever a vital part of their own structure. The Taliban’s handling of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri should serve as a stark warning of how this group engages with international actors.
At the same time, the Taliban are attempting to use Afghanistan’s natural resources to attract foreign investment. Despite lacking legal legitimacy or a constitutional framework, they have signed mining contracts with regional companies—particularly Chinese firms. These agreements are made without any legal basis, as the Taliban annulled all existing laws following their takeover in 2021. Nevertheless, countries like China continue to engage. For the Taliban, such deals represent a crucial pathway toward economic survival and international legitimacy.
Another key tactic involves the systematic abduction of foreign nationals. Despite official travel warnings, some foreign or dual nationals still travel to Afghanistan. The Taliban have used this situation for strategic hostage-taking—detaining individuals and releasing them only in exchange for political negotiations or financial concessions. A notable example was the abduction of American citizens, which led to direct talks with U.S. officials and the release of Taliban prisoners. Credible sources suggest that the Taliban still hold several foreign nationals in custody, using them as bargaining chips in political negotiations.
Yet another strategy involves exploiting the reception of deported Afghan asylum seekers from Western countries. The issue intersects with broader Western concerns over immigration and national security. Far-right parties across Europe have capitalized on violent incidents linked to migrants to challenge liberal immigration policies. Analysts argue that these developments have strengthened far-right populist movements and undermined centrist liberal governments.
While criminal behaviour exists in all societies, the Taliban and their jihadist allies systematically exploit such incidents to spread their ideology and recruit new followers. Their ultimate objective is the establishment of a global Islamic order through violence and the rejection of pluralism. Statistical reviews of terrorist attacks in Europe over the past three years reveal a growing trend of jihadist activity a phenomenon partly attributed to the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 and the Doha Agreement. For extremists, the Taliban’s resurgence symbolizes victory, reinforcing both their ideological and financial motivations.
In Europe, particularly Germany there has been troubling cases linking Taliban propaganda to acts of violence. In 2023, Qari Saeed Khosti, a prominent figure in the Haqqani Network and the Taliban regime, used social media to urge his followers in the West to target “infidels and opponents” with knives. Subsequent incidents appeared to align with this call. Taliban sympathizers have even held commemorative events in European cities for figures such as Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, a senior Haqqani Network leader who was killed in a 2024 ISIS attack in Kabul, presenting him as a hero and role model.
In 2023, during a Taliban official’s visit to the Netherlands and Germany, supporters openly welcomed him and held public gatherings to hear his speeches. Despite protests from Afghan Diasporas communities opposed to the Taliban narrative, host country security forces treated these activities as protected expressions of free speech. The Taliban, however, interpret this tolerance as evidence of their expanding influence within Western societies.
According to first-hand sources from inside Afghanistan, the Taliban not only refrain from punishing deportees but warmly welcome them. It is reported that the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in coordination with the Taliban’s approach, provides each returnee with 13,000 Afghanis—approximately 200 U.S. dollars—at Kabul airport, and supports them in subsequent programs such as shelter provision.
One source notes that Taliban intelligence officers briefly interrogate the returnees and ask them to sign a “guarantee form” pledging adherence to Taliban laws and cooperation when requested. These individuals are also required to fill out a follow-up form after resettlement.
In some cases, the Taliban have labelled these returnees as “mujahedeen” and “heroes,” especially if their actions in the West align with jihadist ideals. This narrative plays a critical role in the Taliban’s propaganda machinery and transforms the deported individuals into tools of psychological and informational warfare against the West.
Overall, the Taliban’s policy toward deportees is part of a broader strategy to exploit every available instrument, from terrorist alliances and natural resource extraction to hostage-taking and narrative management in the context of migration to break their international isolation. In this context, countries like Germany may inadvertently contribute to the Taliban’s grand strategy by deporting Afghan offenders. Without a deep geopolitical understanding, such policies risk granting implicit legitimacy to a regime whose survival hinges on coercion, extremism, and instability.
Western governments must balance domestic security concerns with the long-term consequences of legitimizing an extremist jihadist regime. While public pressure for deporting criminals is understandable, sending them back to a country under the control of a militant group only strengthens the Taliban’s claims to governance, security, and international recognition. The Taliban have repeatedly demonstrated their ability and willingness to turn human suffering, through terrorism, resource exploitation, hostage-taking, or migration into political capital.
Deportation policies lacking geopolitical foresight may satisfy short-term domestic demands but ultimately empower authoritarian regimes that thrive on instability and coercion. If the West continues to pursue a transactional approach, it risks unintentionally facilitating the normalization of the Taliban on the global stage at the cost of Afghanistan’s civil society and human values, and to the detriment of international security.
Besmillah Taban is a Ph.D. student in Security Studies at JU, where he also conducts research on China’s discourse power. He served in various positions within the Afghanistan National Police from 2002 to 2021, including as the Head of the Crime Investigation Department (CID). He can be found on X at @BesmillahTaban.
This article reflects the author’s views and not necessarily those of Amu TV. The piece is based on the author’s analysis and includes references to publicly available reports and media coverage.
