Twenty-three years after the establishment of the State of Israel, Qatar emerged in 1971 as a monarchy following Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf in 1969.
This wealthy Arab state, a member of both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the United Nations, has defended the Palestinian cause in various ways, including calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Alongside providing financial, humanitarian and political support to the Palestinian people, Qatar has also served as a hub for conflict mediation at the international level — particularly with Israel and the West, including the United States.
Before the Oslo Accord of 1990 — the first agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel — Qatar’s foreign policy defined Israel as a hostile state. But after the accord, which stipulated:
Israel would recognize the Palestinian Authority, and the Palestinian Authority would recognize Israel;
The Palestinian Authority would assume internal administration of parts of the West Bank and Gaza;
A transitional Palestinian state would be established for five years under the Palestinian Authority;
Palestinians would have autonomy in education, health, the economy and policing;
Israel would gradually withdraw from parts of the occupied Palestinian territories;
Negotiations would begin over Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, and Palestinian refugees —
relations between Israel and Qatar shifted from hostility to engagement.
In 1993, the first direct contacts between Israel and Qatar were established. By 1996, the two countries had opened trade offices in each other’s capitals. Yet these ties collapsed again after 2000, during the Second Intifada, when the Israeli army suppressed the Palestinian uprising. In 2005, after Israel’s withdrawal from parts of Gaza, relations resumed.
Once again, however, they did not last. Israel’s wars in Gaza in 2008 and 2009 led to another rupture.
Meanwhile, since 2012 Qatar has hosted Hamas’s political office on its territory with U.S. approval, and with Israel’s knowledge it has provided $30 million a month in aid to Hamas and Gaza.
Now, after decades of fluctuating relations between the two countries, on September 9, 2025, Israel launched a sudden attack on Hamas’s political office in Qatar. This came even as Hamas — very likely with encouragement from Qatar and other Arab states — had accepted the Trump administration’s cease-fire plan and was preparing to formally announce it.
Israel’s attack on Qatari territory — a violation of sovereignty under international law — suggests several points:
Israel is not prepared for a cease-fire and has challenged the process advanced by the Trump administration;
Israel may be seeking to eliminate its traditional and ideological enemies in the region through force;
Israel, unwilling to agree to a cease-fire, appears intent on further expanding its occupation of Palestinian lands.
The broader regional implications include:
Strained relations between Arab states, especially members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman), and the United States, their major economic and strategic partner;
Continued tensions across the Middle East;
The potential creation of new political and security institutions by GCC members;
Growing challenges for U.S. interests among its Gulf Arab allies.
In conclusion, the trajectory of Qatar–Israel relations shows how fragile and contingent regional diplomacy remains. The recent Israeli strike on Hamas’s office in Doha not only jeopardizes ongoing cease-fire efforts but also risks destabilizing the Gulf’s delicate balance. Whether the episode leads to renewed confrontation or compels regional powers to forge new mechanisms for cooperation will shape not only the Palestinian question but also the wider security architecture of the Middle East.
Nasrullah Stanekzai is a political analyst and former professor of law and political science at Kabul University.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Amu.
