The security dynamics of the region are far more complex than what is reflected in official statements from U.S., Pakistani, or Taliban officials. The recent arrest and transfer to U.S. custody of the alleged mastermind behind the Abbey Gate attack at Kabul airport—a move credited to Pakistan’s cooperation—raises deeper questions about Islamabad’s role in managing and directing regional militant groups.
For decades, Pakistan has used proxy warfare as a geopolitical tool. From supporting jihadist fighters in the 1980s to backing the Taliban in the 1990s and exploiting terrorist networks after 2001, Islamabad has repeatedly manufactured and then managed security crises to extract political and economic concessions.
Yet, since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Pakistan’s economic situation has worsened, revealing the limits of its influence. With its own financial crisis deepening, Islamabad appears to be cultivating a new front in the region—this time leveraging the Islamic State (ISIS-K) as a means to pressure the Taliban and extract concessions from the United States.
The ISIS factor: Pakistan’s two-track strategy
Pakistan’s recent maneuvers suggest a two-pronged approach:
Pressuring the Taliban: By allowing the ISIS threat to expand within its borders—particularly in areas like Malakand, Bajaur, and Mastung in Balochistan—Pakistan is signaling to the Taliban that it can destabilize Afghanistan if its demands are not met. Key points of contention include the Durand Line dispute, regional alliances, and the Taliban’s position on India.
Securing U.S. Support: At the same time, by amplifying the threat of ISIS within its own borders, Islamabad is positioning itself as an indispensable counterterrorism partner, hoping to secure military and financial aid from Washington—or even the possibility of hosting U.S. bases again.
While most militant groups in the region remain concentrated in Afghanistan, the emergence of ISIS-K strongholds inside Pakistan—reportedly facilitated by Islamabad—suggests a continuation of its long-standing double game. On one hand, Pakistan is tightening pressure on the Taliban. On the other, it is presenting itself to the West as a critical ally in the fight against ISIS.
A growing security vacuum
This dual strategy is deepening instability across the region. As Pakistan manipulates the ISIS threat for strategic advantage, Afghanistan’s security vacuum continues to widen, increasing the risk of regional spillover.
Beyond Afghanistan, the consequences could soon reach neighboring countries like Iran. If history is any indication, Pakistan may not stop at Afghanistan—it could use the same playbook to stoke extremist activity along Iran’s eastern border to create new leverage for future negotiations.
Ultimately, Pakistan’s long-standing strategy of cultivating and managing terrorist threats remains unchanged. Today, ISIS-K is simply the latest pawn in Islamabad’s geopolitical game—one designed to expand its regional influence while securing support from the West.
If history has taught us anything, it is that such a strategy does not contain terrorism—it fuels it. And the consequences may soon extend far beyond South Asia.
Rahmatullah Nabil is the former head of Afghanistan’s intellegence agency, the National Directorate of Security.
Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of this publication.
