Pakistan recently handed over the alleged mastermind behind the August 2021 Kabul airport attack to U.S. authorities. This move is part of a familiar pattern—Islamabad has long claimed to be a key partner in the global fight against terrorism, yet history tells a different story.
For decades, Pakistan has played a dual role: presenting itself as a victim of terrorism while simultaneously fostering extremist groups as strategic assets. From supporting the mujahideen in the 1980s to sheltering the Taliban and other militant factions, Pakistan’s approach to terrorism has been shaped by two key objectives.
Destabilizing regional rivals – Pakistan has used extremist groups to exert pressure on neighboring countries, particularly Afghanistan and India. The country’s security establishment has long viewed a weak and unstable Kabul as preferable to a strong, independent Afghan government.
Securing Western aid – By positioning itself as a frontline state in the fight against terrorism, Pakistan has leveraged its role to obtain billions in financial and military aid from the United States, Arab states, and even regional powers like Iran.
Now, with the return of Donald Trump to the White House, Islamabad appears to be playing the same old game—offering up a terror suspect in an attempt to reset relations with Washington and regain its status as a strategic ally. But this latest move raises serious questions: Is the suspect actually a key planner of the Kabul airport attack, or just a lower-level operative? And more importantly, can Pakistan’s long history of supporting terrorist groups be ignored?
Since the 1980s, Pakistan has served as an incubator for jihadist movements. Its intelligence agency, the ISI, played a pivotal role in arming and training the mujahideen against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, with support from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. But after the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan continued to cultivate extremist groups for its own strategic purposes.
A 1995 British report, later cited in Afghan historical records, detailed how thousands of foreign fighters passed through Pakistan before spreading across the world. These included 5,000 Saudis, 3,000 Yemenis, 2,800 Algerians, 2,000 Egyptians, 400 Tunisians, 370 Iraqis, and 200 Libyans.
These militants, initially trained in Pakistan for the Afghan war, later became the backbone of groups like al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and the Islamic State. From Kashmir to Chechnya, and from North Africa to Southeast Asia, Pakistan’s role in exporting extremism remains undeniable.
Even today, at least ten major terrorist organizations continue to operate with varying degrees of support from Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. These groups are not rogue elements—they are instruments of state policy, used to advance Pakistan’s regional agenda.
The timing of Pakistan’s handover of a terror suspect to the U.S. is significant. With the new Trump administration yet to outline a clear policy on Pakistan, Islamabad is likely trying to rebrand itself as a counterterrorism partner. But history suggests this is little more than a tactical maneuver.
Pakistan’s military and intelligence services have repeatedly engaged in a cycle of arrests and releases—detaining jihadist leaders when international pressure mounts, only to quietly free them later. The most famous example is Osama bin Laden, who was found hiding in Abbottabad, less than a mile from Pakistan’s top military academy.
Even when Pakistan does cooperate, it often extracts concessions in return. In February 2024, Islamabad secured the release of a senior Taliban figure from U.S. custody in exchange for freeing two American prisoners. This transactional approach to counterterrorism has been a hallmark of Pakistan’s dealings with Washington for decades.
Pakistan’s longstanding ties to extremist groups make it an unreliable partner in counterterrorism efforts. While Islamabad may seek to portray itself as part of the solution, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests it remains part of the problem.
The handover of a single suspect will not erase decades of complicity in fostering jihadist networks. Nor will it change the fact that Pakistan’s security establishment continues to see terrorism as a useful tool for achieving strategic objectives.
The United States and its allies must recognize this pattern for what it is—a well-rehearsed diplomatic ploy. Without real accountability, Pakistan’s double game will continue, ensuring that extremist groups remain a persistent threat to global security.
Nasrullah Stanikzai is a political analyst and former professor of law and political science at Kabul University.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Amu.
